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In this paper we carry out technical efficiency, and productivity growth comparisons among the four largest Euro- 
pean carriers and eight of their American counterparts. The time period of our comparisons is 1976 through 
1986. This is a particularly interesting period since it begins just after the informal steps toward deregulation 
in the United States and ends just prior to the introduction of the first wave of reforms by the Council of Ministers 
in Europe. We also identify the potential efficiency gains of the European liberalization by comparing efficiency 
differences between the two carrier groups. The reductions in inefficiency describe the amount that inputs can 
be decreased without altering output. 
1. Introduction 
In this paper we carry out technical efficiency and productivity growth comparisons among 
the four largest European carriers and eight of their American counterparts. The time period 
of our comparisons is 1976 through 1986. This is a part icularly interesting period since 
it begins just  after the informal steps toward deregulation in the United States and ends 
just  pr ior  to the introduction of  the first wave of  reforms by the Council  of  Minis ters  in 
Europe. 1 We also identify the potential efficiency gains of the European liberalization by 
comparing efficiency differences between the two carr ier  groups. The reductions in ineffi- 
ciency describe the amount that inputs can be decreased without altering output. 
Our  analysis also provides a description of  the competit ive standing of  European car- 
riers relative to one another. As such, it is suggestive of  the future success of these airlines 
once the protection of  regulation is relaxed. Moreover, one of  the most politically vocal 
sectors affected by widening competit ion (and its projected effects on inefficiency) will 
be labor. Our  analysis demonstrates that the potential magnitude of  cost savings may more 
than compensate displaced workers. Further, our analysis is useful because it explains why 
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some airlines have favored liberalization in Europe, such as British Air, while others have 
been opposed to it. 
In the next section we describe the data sources and variable constructions. Section 3 
describes alternative estimation procedures for identifying the temporal patterns of ineffi- 
ciency over the study period. The procedures differ in assumptions regarding the correla- 
tion of firm-specific efficiency with factor inputs and other explanatory variables. Estimates 
are discussed in Section 4 with particular emphasis on their implications for the extent 
of resource displacement which would result were European carriers to perform at the same 
level as the deregulated American carriers. The last section provides summary and con- 
cluding remarks. 
2. Data 
Our airline data set consists of a panel of the four largest European carriers: Air France, 
Alitalia, British Air, and Lufthansa, and the eight largest American airlines: American, 
Continential, Delta, Eastern, Northwest, Pan Am, TWA, and United. These four Euro- 
pean carriers supply approximately half of the international traffic of all airlines based 
in Europe. The eight U.S. carriers supply virtually all of the scheduled international traffic 
of the U.S. airline industry. We follow these carriers with annual observations during the 
period 1976 to 1986. The primary data source is the Digest of Statistics from the Inter- 
national Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). With this we construct a set of three airline 
input aggregates: labor, energy/materials, and aircraft fleet. In addition, aggregate airline 
outputs and several of its characteristics are constructed. 
Labor input is an aggregate of five separate categories of employment used in the pro- 
duction of air travel. These categories include pilots, as well as copilots and other cockpit 
crew, flight attendants, mechanics, ticketing and passenger handlers, and other employees. 
Information on annual expenditures and the number of employees are available for these 
categories from ICAO's Fleet and Personnel Series for each year. The discrete approxima- 
tion to the Divisia multilateral index number is used to aggregate these subcomponents 
(Caves, Christensen, and Diewert [1982]). 
Fuel expenses are given for each carrier in ICAO's Financial Data Series. Unfortun- 
ately, there are no carrier specific quantity or price figures given in that source. Contract 
fuel prices for international traffic in different regions is available through ICAO's Regional 
Differences in Fares and Costs. The airline's fuel price is then estimated as a weighted 
average of the domestic fuel price (weighted by domestic available tonne-kilometers), and 
regional prices (weighted by international available tonne-kilometers in the relevant region). 
This method explicitly recognizes that for international carriers not all fuel is purchased 
in the airline's home country. Expenditures on supplies, services and ground based capital 
equipment and taxes are combined into a residual aggregate. Since the purchasing power 
of a dollar or its market exchange rate equivalent is not the same in all countries, we use 
the purchasing power parity exchange rates for the carrier's home country in each year 
constructed from Heston and Summers [1988]. These are adjusted by allowing for changes 
in market exchange rates and changes in price levels. Use of airport runways is based on 
landing fee expenses with aircraft departures as the quantity deflator. The service price 
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for owned ground based equipment is constructed using the original purchase price, a 7 % 
depreciation rate, and the carrier's interest rate on long-term debt. As with the labor input, 
these subcomponents are aggregated using a multilateral index number procedure. Finally, 
energy and the residual category are aggregated into the materials input using the multilateral 
index number procedure. 
Detailed information for aircraft fleets is provided in ICAO's Fleet and Personnel Series. 
In addition to counts of the total number of aircraft, we construct the percentage of the 
fleet that is wide-bodied, which is a measure of average equipment size, and the percent- 
age of the fleet that is turboprop, which is a measure of aircraft speed. 
Information regarding the carrier's output quantities are obtained from ICAO's Commercial 
Airline Traffic Series. While this source permits several possible disaggregations we con- 
sider three components of airline output: passenger service, cargo operations, and incidental 
services which includes, among other things, equipment leasing and maintenance provided 
to other carrier's equipment. Revenues for passenger, cargo and incidental outputs as well 
as explicit subsidies are obtained in ICAO's Financial Data Series. The country's purchas- 
ing power parity is used as a price deflator for incidental output. Revenue tonne-kilometers 
(RTK) is used as a quantity deflator for passenger and cargo outputs. As with the inputs, 
these three components are aggregated using the multilateral index number procedure. 
Three characteristics of airline output are also calculated. These include load factor, stage 
length, and a measure of network size. Load factor provides a measure of service quality 
and is a widely used proxy for service competition in most airline transportation studies. 
Stage length provides a measure of the length of individual route segments in the carrier's 
network. Finally, the number of route kilometers, from the International Air Transport 
Association's Statistical Yearbook, provides a measure of total network size. As the number 
of route kilometers falls, ceteris paribus, route density rises. 
A table listing means and standard deviations for American and European variables are 
in Table 1. One of the more striking differences between these two groups is that while 
the output of an American carrier is on average 50 % larger than that of a European carrier, 
there is little difference on average in the levels of employment or materials usage. The 
number of planes used by European carriers, however, is on average only about half that 
of U.S. airlines. Europeans have clearly chosen a more labor and materials intensive input 
Table 1. Summary statistics. 
American European American European 
Variable Mean Mean Std. Dev. Std. Dev. 
Aggregate output (106 ) 3075.54 2022.64 1165.95 735.71 
Labor (workers) 30730.76 31693.27 12435.41 10459.30 
Materials (106 ) 1690,34 1610.86 569.02 649.48 
Number of planes 220.21 108.10 85.74 37.72 
Load factor 0.60 0.62 0.04 0.03 
Stage length (kilometers) 1295.06 1179.70 422.65 123.48 
Percent wide-body aircraft 24,89 24.04 12.18 16.62 
Percent truboprop aircraft 0.40 0.26 0.99 0.34 
Network size (thous. of kilometers) 302.14 489.51 117.03 143.63 
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mix than carriers in America.  Together with the relatively small differences in load factors 
and stage length, this may be suggestive of service competition incentives among the Euro- 
pean carriers which was extant in the U.S. industry before it was deregulated early in the 
sample period. 
3. Econometric Estimation 
Our estimates of efficiency differences among international airline carriers are based on 
a Cobb-Douglas single output technology and can be interpreted in the neoclassical tradi- 
tion of static long-run equilibrium. While it would be desirable to estimate a flexible form 
such as the translog, we limit our initial study to more parsimonious forms, a Alternative 
approaches, such as examining the partial static long-run equilibrium using a variable cost 
function are not considered here since different objectives of nationalized and private car- 
riers are likely to imply that production decisions are not cost minimizing given market 
prices for at least some airlines. Multiple output specifications, which include domestic 
and international traffic or enplanements along with revenue traffic have been considered 
elsewhere (e.g., Good and Rhodes [1991]) but do not easily lend themselves to the 
econometric issues considered herein. 
Since productive efficiency can be viewed as a residual, we are particularly interested 
in the specificaton of the error term. Three alternative statistical treatments are considered 
for the Cobb-Douglas stochastic frontier production model: 
Yit = Xi t~  "}- Wit~i W f:it, ~i = ?Jo + ui ,  (1) 
where the subscripts i --- 1, . . . ,  N and t = 1, . . . ,  T refer to the firm and to time, respec- 
tively, Yit is the log of aggregate output, Xi' t is a (K) vector of log inputs and other f inn 
characteristics at time t, and Wi't is a (L) vector of explanatory variables which may have 
different effects for different firms. The unobservable firm effects, 5i, can be correlated 
with other explanatory variables and can interact with selected slope and intercept terms. 
This allows us to consider the endogeneity of such variables as load factor to firm specific 
statistical error, ui is asumed to be an i.i.d, zero-mean random vector with covariance 
matrix A. The disturbances eit are taken to be i.i.d, with zero mean, constant variance 
a 2, and to be uncorrelated with both the regressors and ui. 
The distinguishing feature of this model, developed by Cornwell, Schmidt, and Sickles 
[1990], over other panel data models (e.g., Hausman and Taylor [1981] is that Whas coef- 
ficients that depend on i. Where W/constant then (1) is the standard panel data firm ef- 
fect model. In our application, Wis expanded to include a t ime variable (t) which models 
firm specific productivity growth rates. Consequently, the effect for firm i is otit = wi~ ?~i = 
~Jil q- ~i2 t. 
It is useful to describe equation (1) in matrix form as 
y = XI3 + WcSo + v, v = Qu + c, (2) 
w h e r e X i s N T •  k, W i s N T •  L, u i s N L  • 1, a n d Q  = diag(Wi) , i  = 1, . . . , N ,  is 
N T  • NL.  
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The three statistical treatments we consider are the within, or dummy variables estimator, 
generalized least square (GLS), and efficient instrumental variables (IV). Denote PQ as 
the projection onto the column space of Q and Mr as the projection onto the nullspace 
of Q. Let (X1, W1) indicate the regressors which are exogenous to firm effects and the 
regressors (X2, WE) those which are endogenous to the firm effects. The within estimator 
is IV with instruments MQ and is given by 
= (X'MQ X)-1 X'MQ y. (3) 
The GLS estimator is 
I ] 60 = [(X, Q) '  ~ - l ( x ,  W) ] - I (x ,  W) '  a - l y .  (4) 
The efficient IV estimator uses instruments A* = ~2-V2(Ma, X1, W1) where f~ = coy(v) 
and is given by 
r /~ ] =(G'~-vzPA.~2-'/2G)-IG'~)-'/2pA. f~-'/~y, (5) 
L J 
where G = (X, W). The properties of these estimators differ by the extent to which factor 
inputs and other regressors are endogenous to firm effects, which in the panel stochastic 
frontier model are interpreted as technical efficiency. If they are exogenous, then GLS is 
efficient. If any of the regressors are endogenous to the firm effects, then GLS will be 
inconsistent. However, the within estimator is consistent regardless. If firm effects are 
endogenous to some, though not all regressors, then some of the efficiency gains of GLS 
can be obtained by efficient 1V without sacrificing the consistency of the within estimator. 
These estimators are discussed in depth by Cornwell, Schmidt, and Sickles [1990]). The 
6ia and 6i2 parameters are estimated by regressing the residuals for firm i on W/t. Consis- 
tent estimates of the frontier intercept at time t and the firm-specific relative level of technical 
inefficiency for firm i at time t, lxit , are 
F q 
o t t=max(o t j t ) ,  j = l  . . . . .  N; mt = exp / -e~----z~ | .  (6) 
j ~ L I 
For firm i, productivity growth at time t is evaluated as the time derivative of c~it? 
4. Empirical Results 
In addition to the standard inputs (capital (K), labor (L), and materials (M)), we augment 
the production function with several capital, output, and network characteristics (percent 
turboprop aircraft (PTURBO), percent wide-bodied aircraft (PWIDEB), and load factor 
(LOADF), stage length (STAGEL), network size (NETSIZE)), time (T), and time-squared. 
Parameter estimates for the three treatments of correlations, within, GLS and efficient 
IV, are given in Table 2. The efficient IV estimator allows efficiency to be correlated with 
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Table 2. Parameter estimates for within, GLS, and IV models. 
Within Estimates Eft. IV Estimates GLS Estimates 
Variable Estimate t SLat Estimate t SLat Estimate t Stat 
Intercept * 1.125 2.100 1.330 2.307 
In K 0.349 3.411 0.339 4.266 0.360 4.741 
in L 0.468 4.887 0.347 4.195 0.355 4.342 
In M 0.221 2.419 0.280 3.161 0.280 3.241 
PTURBO -0.044 -0.163 -0.123 -0.486 -0.143 -0.910 
PWlDEB 0.330 1.170 0.186 0.725 0.256 1.067 
In STAGEL 0.024 0.202 0.045 0.433 0.078 0.921 
In LOADF 1.048 7.435 1.053 7.500 1.048 7.970 
In NET -0.065 - 1.041 -0.034 -0.647 -0.055 - 1.219 
T * 0.031 2.532 0.028 2.471 
T2(• 102) -0.012 -0.124 -0.031 -0.515 -0.046 -0.365 
Model adj R 2 0.999 0.987 0.992 
D.W. 2.091 1.962 1.878 
*The within estimate of the intercept and coefficient on T are not comparable since they depend on the arbitrary 
choice of which firm dummies to exclude. These parameters are not included in Hausman-Wu tests. 
a subset of the regressors. X2 contains the output and capital characteristics: PTURBO, 
PWIDEB, STAGEL, LOADF, and NETSIZE,  and W 2 is a null matrix.  The variables in 
X2 were altered significantly by U.S. carriers during the transition to deregulation and may 
be endogenous to the level of and growth in efficiency. Empirical  evidence (Cornwell, 
Schmidt, and Sickles [1990]) also points to the endogeneity of these variables. 
The three sets of estimates describe production technologies with similar properties. For 
all three procedures returns to density, whose point estimates range from 1.04 for within 
to 0.97 for GLS, and returns to scale, whose point estimates from 1.10 for the within model 
to 1.01 for the GLS model,  are insignificantly different from unity to the 1% level 3 Output 
elasticities for capital fall in the range [0.34, 0.37] while those for the energy/materials 
aggregate and for labor are in the ranges [0.22, 0.28] and [0.35, 0.47]. Estimated elasticities 
for network and capital characteristics vary across the within, GLS and IV models. The 
signs of the point estimates are quite plausible although individually they are not statistic- 
ally significant. Reducing the size of the network increases route density. In general, more 
output can be produced with the same level of resources over long, dense route structures 
with larger aircraft. 
Since the primary distinction among these techniques is the imposition of othogonality 
restrictions, the assumptions underlying the GLS and efficient IV estimates can be tested. 
At conventional significance levels 2 (X9,0.o5 = 16.9) the Hausman-Wu test leads to a rejec- 
tion of both the GLS (X 2 = 22.5) and efficient IV (X 2 = 20.2) models for these data in 
favor of those from the within model  which allows for correlation of all regressors with 
the f irm effects. The remainder of our empirical  discussion is consequently based on the 
within estimates. 
Technical efficiency estimates are given in Table 3 for each carrier. Table 4 summarizes 
the European and American efficiency averages as well as productivity growth rates. Among 
the American carriers, there is generally an increase in efficiency over the study period 
116 
COMPARISONS OF EUROPEAN AND U.S. AIR CARRIERS 121 
Table 3. Estimate of technical efficiency for within model (percent). 
Airline 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Air France 65.83 66.37 66.00 65.65 65.27 64.91 64.55 64.19 63.83 63.47 63.12 
Alitalia 59.93 60.24 59.73 59.22 58.72 58.22 57.73 57.24 56.75 56.27 55.79 
American 73.46 74.54 74.61 74.68 74.74 74.81 74.88 74.95 75.01 75.08 75.15 
British Air 58.73 60.62 61.72 62.84 63.97 65.13 66.31 67 .51  68.74 69.98 71.25 
Continental 76.58 78.00 78.35 78.71 79.07 79.44 79.80 80.17 80.54 80.90 81.28 
Delta 73.08 74.25 74 .41  74.57 74.73 74.90 75.06 75.22 75.38 75.54 75.71 
Eastern 66.89 67.81 67.79 67.77 67.75 67.74 67.72 67.70 67.69 67.67 67.65 
Lufthansa 66.62 67.02 66.49 65.97 65.46 64.94 64.43 63.93 63.43 62.93 62.44 
Northwest 98.63 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Pan Am 100.00 99.65 97.95 96.27 94.62 93.01 91 .41  89.85 88 .31  86.80 85.32 
TWA 72.32 74.12 74.93 75.74 76.57 77.41 78.25 79.10 79.96 80.84 81.72 
United 71.07 72.91 73.78 74.65 75.55 76.45 77.36 78.28 79.21 80.15 81.11 
Table 4. European and American airline productivity growth rates and technical efficiencies (within estimates). 
Productivity Growth (%) Technical Efficiencies (%) 
Year Europe U.S. Year Europe U.S. 
76 2.8 2.8 76 62.9 77.0 
77 2.7 2.8 77 63.8 78.2 
78 2.7 2.8 78 63.8 77.7 
79 2.7 2.7 79 64.0 78.3 
80 2.7 2.7 80 64.0 79.0 
81 2.6 2.6 81 64.1 79.0 
82 2.5 2.6 82 64.2 79.0 
83 2.5 2.6 83 64.2 79.2 
84 2.6 2.6 84 64.5 79.1 
85 2.6 2.6 85 64.6 79.2 
86 2.5 2.7 86 64.7 79.4 
f rom an average of  77% in 1976 to 79 .4% in 1986 (see Table 4). This 0 .24% average 
annual increase in technical efficiency can be added to the 2 .4% average annual technological 
change 5 to y ie ld  an average of  2 .7% average annual  product iv i ty  growth.  This reduct ion 
in heterogenei ty  (less eff icient  f i rms are converging toward the product ion  frontier) is con-  
sistent with the deregula tory  process.  F i rms  lost  both their  protected niches and non- 
systematic ne twork  restrictions.  This  was especial ly  true for Pan A m .  Pan A m  had been 
the designated U.S. car r ie r  for several European  and oriental  routes. As  a part  of  the 
deregula tory  process,  the Uni ted States began to open its internat ional  routes  to other  car- 
t iers.  Without  any f i rm feeder  ne twork  within the Uni ted States (only a very l imited net- 
work  concentrated in N e w  England was provided  by the acquis i t ion of  Nat ional  in 1979), 
Pan A m  was severely disadvantaged,  and ul t imately sold its oriental  routes to Uni ted in 
1986. Northwest ,  on the o ther  hand,  already had a wel l -developed feeder  ne twork  with 
hubs in Minneapol is  and Detroit  for its oriental routes. This carr ier  is also one  with a reputa- 
t ion for negotiat ing very  f lexible work  rules wi th  its unions,  providing another  rat ionale 
for the stellar eff iciency performance .  Another  reason for the relat ively high efficiency 
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of Pan Am, which ceased operations in 1991, and TWA, which filed for bankruptcy in 
the same year, is that both have relatively long average stage lengths. Since their network 
remained relatively unchanged during the sample, very little within variation of stage length 
remains after the within transformation. The efficiency effect may be an artifact of long 
haul flights which are not being controlled for adequately due to the low explanatory power 
of stage length. 
The four European carriers had approximately a 0.18% average annual increase in 
technical efficiency over the sample period. This can be added to the 2.4 % average annual 
technological change to yield nearly the same rate of productivity growth as experienced 
by U.S. carriers. This finding is potentially misleading, however, as there are considerable 
differences among firms. British Air shows a 2 % annual increase in technical efficiency, 
while the average for other European carriers is a 0.7% average annual decline in technical 
efficiency. Under the Thatcher government, British Air was reorganized as part of an 
economy-wide move toward privatization of national industries and was eventually sold in 
January 1987. During this period, neither the French, German, or Italian governments 
made significant moves toward increasing private interests in their near total government 
enterprises. In fact, the French and Italians have maintained a high level of explicit sub- 
sidies. 6 The difference also appears to be reflected in the different attitudes toward intra- 
European bilateral agreements: Great Britain has been a strong proponent of liberaliza- 
tion, while France and Italy have been strongly against it. 
There are large differences between the average technical efficiencies of European and 
American carriers. Table 4 shows that U.S. carriers were nearly 15% more efficient 
throughout the study period than European airlines (this efficiency gap is nearly the same 
across all three of our estimated models). Figure 1 dissaggregates technical efficiency scores 
for the European carriers and compares them to the U.S. average. Technical efficiency levels 
are also projected through 1996. This provides a reasonable first estimate of the relative 
competitive advantage of individual European carriers. For Air France, Lufthansa and 
Alitalia, one possible reason for the declining technical efficiency levels is the loss of feeder 
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Figure 1. Estimated and projected levels of technical efficiency. 
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traffic in the United States as American carriers increasingly began offering their own inter- 
national service. The figure also illustrates British Air's substantial reduction in inefficiency. 
British Air's technical efficiency passes Air France in 198t, the worst of the U.S. carriers 
(Eastern) in 1984, and were trends to continue, the U.S. average in 1993. 
Although point estimates of time trends in efficiencies suggest heterogeneity among car- 
riers in Europe and in the United States, further examination reveals highly significant 
differences in levels, but no statistically significant differences in trends among all carriers 
(F = 1.28, v n = 11, Vd = 99). Whether additional time periods and a larger number of 
European firms will provide more precise estimates of heterogeneous firm-specific trends 
or homogeneous firm-specific trends in efficiency is unclear. 
As mentioned (note 2), measurement of allocative distortions is not carried out in this 
research. The possibility exists that the magnitude of allocative inefficiency is such that 
it offsets the differences in technical efficiency between the U.S. and European industries. 
However, evidence ori the U.S. carriers suggests that the magnitude of allocative distor- 
tions is substantially smaller than the fifteen percent technical inefficiency differences be- 
tween U.S. and European carriers during our study period (Sickles, Good, and Johnson 
[1986]; Sickles [1987]; Good, Nadiri, and Sickles [1992]). Comparable studies are yet 
to be completed for the European carriers. Consequently, the public policy implications 
of  our research are viewed in absence of  such large countervailing allocative distortions. 
The opening up of competition in Europe is likely to pressure firms to eliminate much 
of  this efficiency gap. Implications of  eliminating the gap on the four large European car- 
riers are reported in Table 5. Since these four carriers produce approximately half of the 
output of Association of European Airlines members, we can double the figures in this 
table to get a rough idea as to what the implications would be for all of Europe. We find 
that bringing all European airlines up to the U.S. performance average in 1986 would have 
saved the entire European airline industry approximately $4 billion (in 1986 prices) an- 
nually which is about 16% of total operating costs. This is a m i n i m u m  estimate since it 
does not include the costs of allocative inefficiency. Were output to remain fixed, such a 
Table 5. Within estimates of cost and labor reductions resulting from elimination of technical efficiency gap between 
U.S. and European carriers. 
Total Operating Explicit Cost of Workers Average 
Year Cost Subsidy TE Eliminated Wage ($) 
76 5,436. * 875.64 19,207. l 1,873. 
77 6,371. 101.31 1,047.62 2I ,748. 14,989. 
78 7,969. 118.22 1,311.92 22,244. 18,297. 
79 10,160. 112.23 1,669.74 22,240. 21,706. 
80 12,328. 95.84 2,026.60 22,085. 26,094. 
81 11.390. 71.75 1,877.01 21,087. 23,453. 
82 10,642. 76.43 1,767.41 19,858. 23,001. 
83 10,663. 54.49 1,773.57 20,000. 22,646. 
84 11,267. * 1,843.50 20,421. 22,032. 
85 11,850. * 1,944.02 21,086. 21,946. 
86 12,433. * 2,022.27 21,083. 25,342. 
*Missing data 
All amounts are in $ millions unless otherwise stated. 
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change could lead to the displacement of  approximately 16 % of the entire European airline 
workforce, or about 42,000 workers. Cost savings from such a 16% reduction in labor 
and other inputs could compensate displaced workers much the way that special provisions 
in U.S. unemployment insurance were established. However, there are two countervailing 
forces which should be considered in subsequent analyses. First, the input mix is likely 
to change. Second, demand for air travel appears to be fairly elastic. There has been a 
large increase in air travel with accompanying increases in employment in the U.S. airline 
industry due to fare reductions accompanying deregulation, even though labor intensities 
have fallen. On the other hand, the potential for output increases in the European airlines 
may be lessened by the presence of substitute transportation modes, particularly the railroads. 
Unlike in the United States, these may offer up substantial competition to intra-European 
air travel which may mitigate the scope for increasing output through fare reductions. 
5. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
This paper has analyzed technical efficiencies and productivity growth rates for four Euro- 
pean and eight American air carriers using three alternative estimators. While nominal 
efficiency measures are fairly different across these estimators, the properties of technology 
and the estimation of  an efficiency gap between European carriers are rather stable. 
Eliminating the efficiency gap brings with it a savings on the order of $4.5 billion per 
year and a displacement of about 42,000 workers across the European industry. 
As the title of our paper indicates, this is a fn'st look at a very rich set of data that are 
continuing to be collected as well as a first look at somewhat reduced form explanations 
of  the sources technical efficiency differences between Europe and America. As our Euro- 
pean carrier list becomes more exhaustive, as we extend our time period to the early 1990s, 
and as we augment the European and American carriers with the remaining major world 
carriers, we anticipate being able to examine more structural explanations for the presence 
of  technical and allocative distortions. The role that differing regulatory and institutional 
constraints have on the evolution of  the international airline industry and how chatages in 
these constraints will impact the survival propensities of  particular carriers is yet another 
issue on which we will focus subsequent research. 
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No~s 
1. For a survey of the institutional setting surrounding U.S. deregulation, European liberalization, and the inter- 
national airline industry the reader is referred to Bailey, Graham, and Kaplan [1985], de Murias [1990], 
and Kaspar [1991]. For an early empirical study of European and U.S. airlines see Barla and Perlman [1989]. 
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2. Substitution elasticities are unity for the Cobb-Douglas. Caves et al. [1984] and Sickles et al. [1986] both 
estimate elasticities of substitution of between -0 .1  and 0.5, although they estimate cost and profit functions 
and theft inputs are defined somewhat differently. Still, Madalla [1979] notes that measurement of technological 
change and efficiency are quite insensitive to the choice of functional form of production since both of these 
properties are related to shifts of the isoquants rather than their shapes. This initial study focuses on technical 
efficiency and leaves the analysis of allocative distortions for future research. 
3. The empirical specification outlined in Section 4 includes a quadratic time effect that is common to all firms. 
All firm-specific productivity growth rates must be adjusted accordingly to also include the common time 
derivative of this second-order time effect. 
4. Returns to density is based on the elasticity of output with respect to a proportionate increase in the inputs, 
K, L and M, while holding other variables fixed. Returns to scale, is based on a proportionate increase in 
inputs and network density which increases when the number of route kilometers in the network (NET) falls. 
Note that these are not comparable to the returns to density and scale constructed by examining the ray average 
costs of producing ton miles of service and serving destinations. The interpretation of network in a single 
output study such as this is a characteristic of the output, which although potentially endogenous to firm ef- 
fects, is nonetheless not interpreted as a separate output. 
5. Following Nishimizu and Page [1982] we use the term technological change to describe the rate of increase 
of the efficient production technology (in our notation, measured by changes in the c~ t over time). Productivi- 
ty growth includes both technological change and reductions in technical inefficiency. 
6. Explicit subsidies include only overt transfers from the government to cover operating losses. Other transfers 
do occur, such as government purchases of stock at unreasonably high prices, favorable rents for the use of 
government facilities, etc. 
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